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DATA-DRIVEN MERGERS: A CALL FOR FURTHER 
INTEGRATION OF DYNAMIC EFFECTS INTO COMPETITION 
ANALYSIS1 
Andressa Lin Fidelis 
 
Abstract: This article assesses the increasing concentration of data-driven 
platforms, and argues that a dynamic analysis is better equipped to address 
challenges stemming from data-driven merges in the digital markets. It first 
analysis the intersection between big data, entry barriers and innovation. 
Secondly, it presents the legal and economic implications of considering trends 
and future market conditions into the merger review. Finally, by revisiting the 
European Commission approval of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, this article 
considers the need for defining a market for data, the possibility of eliminating 
a potential competitor, the incentives to tip a connected market and to reduce 
quality in terms of privacy degradation.  
Resumo: Este artigo avalia a crescente concentração de plataformas digitais 
baseadas em big data, e argumenta que uma análise dinâmica é melhor 
equipada para endereçar os desafios originados de tais plataformas nos 
mercados digitais. Primeiramente, analisa-se a intersecção entre big data, 
barreira de entrada e inovação. Posteriormente, avalia-se as implicações legais 
e econômicas de se considerar tendências e condições de mercado futuras na 
análise de atos de concentração. Finalmente, por meio da reanálise da decisão 
de aprovação da Comissão Europeia referente à aquisição do WhatsApp pelo 
Facebook, este artigo considera a necessidade se definir um mercado relevante 
para dados, a possibilidade de se eliminar um concorrente potencial, alavancar 
poder de mercado para um mercado conexo, e reduzir qualidade em termos de 
degradação de privacidade. 
Keywords: Facebook/WhatsApp, merger control, big data, dynamic analysis, 
network effect, privacy. 
Palavras-chave: Facebook/WhatsApp, atos de concentração, big data, análise 
dinâmica, externalidades de rede.  
                                                     
1 This article was originally published on November 20, 2017 in the November 2017 
edition of CADE´s Revista da Concorrência including an extra section on privacy and 
competition law & economics. 
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1. Introduction 
Data-driven mergers are the transactions that aim at acquiring, 
combining and/or monetizing large amounts of commercially valuable data 
gathered from multiple sources and formats2. In the digital markets (e.g., e-
commerce, social networks, search engines, online advertisement, etc.), 
examples can be found in the mergers between Verizon/Yahoo! (2016), 
Microsoft/LinkedIn (2016), Facebook/WhatsApp (2014), Google/DoubleClick 
(2008), etc.3.  
Those transactions benefit from the developments of artificial 
intelligence, data mining and machine learning, allowing data to be analyzed 
for insights that can reduce product and process innovation costs. Indeed, 
consumers’ data is at the core of the business model4 and largely explain the 
market power enjoyed by the world’s most valuable public companies, namely 
Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook5. 
Although data-driven markets bring several challenges such as the 
interplay between privacy and competition law6, transparency and robo-sellers 
                                                     
2 Doug Laney crafted the pioneer definition of big data in three dimensions: (i) volume: 
data comes in large amount and it is collected from a variety of sources such as business 
transactions, social media, information from sensor, machine-to-machine, etc.; (ii) 
velocity: data streams in at an unprecedented speed and must be dealt with in near-real 
time; and (iii) variety: data can be structured and unstructured and comes in all types of 
formats, e.g., numeric or text documents, e-mail, video, audio, etc.. See Laney (2001). 
More recently, extra dimensions have been added, including: (iv) variability; (v) 
veracity; (vi) validity; (vii) vulnerability; (viii) volatility; (ix) visualization; and (x) 
value. See Firican (2017). 
3Verizon/Yahoo!, Case M.8180, EC’s Decision on 21.12.2016; Microsoft/LinkedIn, 
Case M.8124, EC’s Decision on 6.12.2016; Facebook/WhatsApp, Case M.7217, EC’s 
Decision on 03.10.2014, and; Google/DoubleClick, Case M.4731, EC’s Decision on 
22.07.2008. Other big data mergers include Facebook/Instagram for $1 bn (2012), 
Alphabet/Waze for $1.2 bn (2013), among others (The Economist, 2017). 
4Described as a “raw material for digital business models”, personal information has 
become a factor of competition used to improve products and targeted advertising. See 
Monopolkomission (2015, p. 36). 
5 Based on the Financial Times Global 500 ranking of 2017, Apple, Alphabet (Google), 
Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook are among the 8 publicly traded companies having 
the greatest market capitalization. 
6 This article notes that refraining from accounting for any post-merger privacy harm is 
a relevant drawback of the current merger control enforcement. For exceptions of this 
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cartels7, this article focus on the economic characteristics of big data and the 
role of a dynamic analysis to review the increasing concentration of super data-
platforms. Specifically, this article proposes a re-analysis of the European 
Commission (“EC”) merger investigation regarding Facebook/WhatsApp to 
test what would have changed if a more forward-looking analysis were taken 
into account. 
The remaining of this report is organized as follow: Section 2 
analyzes whether information can yield data-driven platforms an unreplicable 
competitive advantage. Section 3 explains how dynamic analysis can 
contribute to improve data-driven mergers’ review. Section 4 evaluates what 
could have changed if a more dynamic analysis were adopted in the 
Facebook/WhatsApp merger analysis. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the 
main takeaways and proposing that dynamic effects, consumer choice, and 
merger control be analyzed more holistically.  
2. Data-driven markets: can a concentrated market still be competitive? 
Although Apple, Alphabet/Google, Microsoft, Amazon and 
Facebook have enjoyed high market shares, reaching billion of users, and 
significant profits8, some for over a decade now (EDPS, 2016), some experts 
claim that data-driven markets have nearly zero entry barriers because data is 
ubiquitous, low cost, and widely available9. At anytime, coming from a garage 
somewhere, Schumpeterian “gales of creative destruction” could displace 
Google or Facebook in the same way that they displaced Yahoo! and MySpace. 
                                                     
trend, see Bundeskartellamt’s investigation on Facebook’s alleged abuse of privacy 
terms (Press Release, March 2, 2016), and the Italian Competition Authority 
investigation on WhatsApp’s Term of Use (May 11, 207). 
7 On the debate about how price transparency can backfire via anticompetitive price 
discrimination and logarithm collusion, see OECD (2016), OECD (2017), Schrepel 
(2017). 
8 According with Jonathan Taplin, Alphabet/Google has 88% search advertising and is 
valued at $530.6 bi, Amazon has 75% in online book sales and is valued at $362.4 bi, 
and Facebook/Instagram/WhatsApp 74% market share of mobile social and is valued 
at $357 bi. Google and Facebook have each nearly 2 billion customers. See the 
Conference: Does America have a concentration problem? March 28, 2017, Chicago, 
US, https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/single-events/march-27-2017. 
9 In November 26, 2012, Ron Wyden, U.S. senator, declared in the FTC’s investigation 
against Google’s search bias case: “compared to almost any other market in the history 
of antitrust regulation, online search has effectively zero barriers to entry”, 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=94C57310-59D3-4D6E-84BE-
FF957413BCC3&download=1. 
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Thus, most calls for more antitrust intervention against data-driven platforms 
should be regarded as merely “antitrust populism” (Lamadrid and Villiers, 
2017, p. 3). 
On the other hand, many consider that data’s nature favors long 
lasting dominance and are concerned about the entrenchment of data-driven 
platforms to the detriment of innovation10, consumer welfare11, and even 
democracy12. The so-called Brandeisian movement considers that the fear of 
antitrust agencies of overreaching fails to serve the public13. In face of the 
“tsunami” of digital mergers, US Senators doubt that the agencies are getting 
the job done (Dayen, 2016). 
To assess whether informational power can become monopoly power, 
this article focus on three main characteristics of data-driven markets: (i) data 
as a competitive advantage asset; (ii) higher entry barriers mainly caused by 
indirect network effects; and (iii) the tendency for market tipping in favor of 
the data-driven incumbent.  
2.1. Data as a competitive advantage 
Due to the alleged non-rivalrous14 nature of data, some authors claim 
that no incontestable market power could be derived from it (Tucker and 
Wellford, 2014). Indeed, factual information such as name, age, gender, home 
address, etc. are commonly provided to multiple entities, but they are not the 
kind of inputs that search engines, social networks or e-commerce need to 
provide relevant services to both sides of their platforms (CMA, 2015, paras 
2.53-2.54). The volume, scope, and precision of analysis of data gathered 
nowadays cannot be compared to a brick-and-mortar world. 
Successful data-driven platforms have an established user base 
allowing them to collect, store and process large, real-time data about users last 
                                                     
10 As observed by The Economist (September 17, 2016) the number of startups in the 
US is the lower since the 1970s. 
11 Authors like Stucke and Grunes (2017 and 2016) have tackled the commonly asserted 
“myths” regarding the contestability of data-driven markets. 
12 See Dayen (2017). 
13 As described by Dayen (2017, p. 4-5), the “New Brandeis movement” is formed by 
a group of scholars that has rebelled against Chicago-school dictates. For the Supreme 
Court Judge Louis Brandeis: “we can have democracy in this country, or we can have 
great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.” 
14 A non-rivalrous good means that the cost of providing it to a marginal individual is 
zero (Cornes and Sandler, 1968). In big data, it means that the same data may be used 
by different firms at the same time. 
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minute interests, sentiments, influence, and behavior15. Specifically, search 
engines care about search queries history and clicked links. Social networks 
care about profile information, and constructing the user’s social graph. E-
commerce cares about users’ purchase history. This information is far from 
being easily collected and it is not readily available on the market (Grunes and 
Stucke, 2015).  
Moreover, the fixed costs involved in setting up the necessary tools 
for collecting and analyzing data are high. Third party access is also a remote 
possibility. While platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn prohibit third parties 
from scrapping content off its platforms, Google restricts portability of 
advertising campaigns (Graef, 2015), not to mention all the patents involved. 
This is because data is the input that strength both sides of their platforms: (i) 
advertisers benefit from better targeted advertising business possibilities; and 
(ii) users benefit from the higher quality of the functionalities offered.  
Big data advantage also allows dominant platforms to closely 
oversight (or nowcast16) not only consumers’ behavior and markets’ trends, but 
also the development of rivals’ business model and nascent threats. No wonder 
why almost every (realistic) start-up’s dream is to be acquired by, rather than 
become the next big data titan (The Economist, September 2016).  
Regardless of being considered, the “new currency of the internet” 
(Vestager, 2016), the oil of the XXI century (The Economist, May 2017), the 
important antitrust factor is that big data is commercially valuable – as we can 
tell by the value of their billionaire acquisitions17 –, a driver of change, a 
competitive advantage for incumbents18, and entry barrier for entrants (Graef, 
2015).  
                                                     
15 Big data has to be processed by logarithms and AI to become valuable. However, the 
comparative importance of the former compared to the later has been addressed even 
by Google’s chief scientist in 2010, who peremptorily affirmed that “we don’t have 
better algorithms than anyone else. We just have more data”. See Asay and O’Reilly 
(2010). 
16 Nowcasting is defined as the prediction of the present, the very near future and the 
very recent past in economics, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nowcasting_(economics).  
17 Only Facebook/WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn transactions amount for more 
than $48 billions. 
18 In the EU, the legal test and threshold for treating an input as an essential facility is 
significantly high, see the ECJ in IMS Health  (case C- 418/01, para. 34-52) and 
Bronner (case, C-7/97, para.44-45). The US case law is even more averse to applying 
the doctrine. From an economic point of view, a dynamic framework may be more 
productive to address data issues than the essential facility doctrine. 
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2.2. Entry barriers & data-driven indirect network effects 
With respect to entry barriers, the challenge pose by data-driven 
markets is that on top of the traditional network effects19, there are the effects 
derived from scale20 (i.e., learning-by-doing) and scope21 (i.e., multiple data 
aspects of one user), and what some author have called spill-over or “data-
driven indirect network effect” (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017), which have 
widen the gap between incumbent and entrants relevance of service. Indeed, the 
existence of an indirect network effect that crosses customer groups is what 
characterizes a business as multi-sided22 (Graef, 2015, p. 476). 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) propose an innovative dynamic model 
of R&D competition to show that, due to indirect network effects, data-driven 
markets become stably monopolized (“tip”) under very mild conditions23. The 
model’s fundamental mechanism is to treat demand side-generated user 
preferences or characteristics as an input into the supply side-run innovation 
process. Thus, user information is an input into a firm’s efforts to improve its 
perceived product quality and therefore reduces firm’s cost of innovation. In 
the case of search engines, e.g., users’ clicking behavior is the driver for indirect 
network effects.  
As explained by the authors, a key feature of the “datafication” 
process is the growing importance of the indirect network effect, which 
combine the machine-generated data about user information, as a by-product of 
                                                     
19 A network effect is either direct when the consumers’ utility increases as the number 
of consumers grows, or indirect when the increasing number of consumers of a good 
leads to more complementary products or services that raises the value of the network 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985). In the case of search engine services, the indirect network 
externality lies on the fact that the search results increase in relevance the more search 
data become available to the search engine (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012). 
20 Economies of scale arise when the incremental costs of creating additional units 
decline as the scale of production increases (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). In data-driven 
markets, users and advertisers expect to gain more value and are attracted to platforms 
with the largest group of customers. 
21 As suggested by Stucke and Grunes (2017), entry barriers are originated from four 
network effects: (i) classic network effects; (ii) network effects arising from the scale 
of data; (iii) network effects from the scope of data; and (iv) how network effects on 
one side of a platform can spill over to the other side. 
22 We agree with Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) who does not define search engines 
and social networks as two-sided, but as semi-two-sided, as a higher number of 
advertisers do not necessarily benefit users.  
23 The authors adopt a model where duopolists repeatedly choose their innovation 
investments to compute the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria with a finite time horizon.  
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using goods and services that are connected to the internet, with a reduction in 
the marginal cost of innovation on the supply side, s.t. the marginal cost of 
innovating c(x, Di), is decreasing in demand: cx,Di < 0
24.  
As concluded by the authors, such combination cannot be easily 
copied by rivals or overcome by a disruptive innovator. Thus, data-driven 
markets do seem to pose higher barriers to entry resulting from the indirect 
network effects. Indeed, as observed by Stucke and Grunes (2017), if barriers 
to entry were low, Google wouldn’t have intentionally degraded quality to favor 
its vertical service, and Microsoft wouldn’t have spent over $4.5 billion to 
develop the algorithm and capacity to operate Bing – without virtually any 
success.  
2.3. Market tipping & innovation 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) show that there is a strong first-mover 
advantage in data-driven markets, which tip under very mild conditions. In the 
game proposed by the authors, it means that when quality difference is 
sufficiently large, firms do not value future too much (δ is sufficiently low), 
and innovating is not so expensive, eventually, one firm will dominate the 
market by having full demand in every second period.  
An alarming feature of a tipped market is that “there are very little 
incentives for both the dominant firm and the ousted firm to further invest in 
innovation” (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017, p. 2). This is because, by backward 
induction, the smaller firm will choose not to invest in innovation since it knows 
that the dominant firm will be able to match any investment at a lower marginal 
cost. Knowing this, the dominant’s best response is also not to invest. Thus, 
market tipping cannot only raise barriers to entry, but it can also harm 
consumers due to the resulting underprovision of innovation. 
When a market favors a “winner takes all outcome where monopoly 
is the nearly inevitable outcome of market success” (OECD, 2014, p. 60), 
competition authorities should have more reasons to be concerned about 
mergers that can tip the market, either in the service or product market where 
the acquirer already enjoys a large share, either in connected markets in which 
the acquirer can leverage its position, using information gained in his market of 
origin to tip a second or multiple markets (domino effect) (Prüfer and 
                                                     
24 According with the model, the firms have to incur in the following investment cost 
to increase its quality by x unit: c(x,Di) = γx2/2 + αx[1-Di(Δ)], where γ is a parameter 
that measures the difficulty to innovate, α is a parameter that measures data-driven 
indirect network effects, Di is the demand in T-1, and Δ is the quality difference 
between the 2 firms. 
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Schottmüller, 2017), as detailed in Section 4 below.   
Alternatives to guarantee market contestability in data-driven markets 
include fostering consumers’ data ownership and portability initiatives25. Also, 
data sharing of anonymized user information could allow competitors to 
overcome the incumbent’s data advantage (The Economist, March26 and May27, 
2017), while eliminating the mechanism causing data-driven markets to tip28-29. 
In sum, data can become an insuperable competitive advantage when: 
(i) acquirer’s dominant position has been stable for a significant period; (ii) data 
is not easily replicable and the incumbent relies on exclusivity and IP rights; 
(iii) data-driven indirect network effects are strong; and (iv) the mergers can 
help the product market or a correlated market to tip.   
3. Incorporating a more dynamic approach into merger analysis: what 
does it mean? 
According with Ginsburg and Wright (2012, p. 1-3), dynamic 
competition models refer to the relationship between present competitive 
activities and the prediction of future market conditions such as “entry, 
investment, innovation, price, output, and quality”30. As defined by Sidak and 
Teece (2009), an analysis that favors dynamic competition over static 
competition would place less weight on market share and concentration and 
                                                     
25 In the EU, beginning in May 2018, the Regulation 2016/679 will impose an obligation 
on firms to enable individuals to take their personal data with them when they quit using 
an online service.  
26 In the EU, beginning in January 2018, the Second Payment Service Directive (PSD2) 
will compel banks to share customer-account information with licensed financial-
services providers, under the consent of the account-holder. 
27 Ben Thompson, suggested that dominant social networks should be required to allow 
access to their social graphs, and highlighted that Instagram got off the ground by 
having new users import the list of their followers from Twitter. 
28 If, e.g., Facebook does not have exclusive rights of user information, competitors 
face the same cost function, and there is no cost advantage in producing quality. See 
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017). 
29 Effects on total welfare are mixed because if there is no tipping, investments costs 
are duplicated. However, if data-driven indirect network effects are sufficiently high, 
data sharing obligations can increase total welfare. See Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017). 
30 According with the authors, the term “dynamic analysis” has been used in at least 
two different ways: (i) to incorporating the creation of new products and business 
models into the static model of competition; and (ii) the relationship between present 
competitive activities and future market conditions. 
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more weight on assessing potential competition31 and enterprise-level 
capabilities32.  
Empirical analysis of mergers has been traditionally dominated by 
static microeconomic theory, holding fixed the set of incumbent firms and 
products in the market33-34. However, there are important reasons why merger 
analysis should further incorporate a dynamic approach. In the merger context, 
the static criterion to assess competition is the immediate price effects in a given 
market (as well as change in market shares), while a dynamic evaluation also 
considers the innovation process (Marshall and Parra, 2016), as well as post-
merger changes in firms’ incentives and behavior.  
As observed by Sidak and Teece (2009, p. 41): “[t]he question should 
be framed not in terms of whether product-market competition will be impaired, 
as that is too much of an immediate concern, but in terms of whether capabilities 
will be brought under unitary control, thereby possibly thwarting future variety 
in new product development”. As recognized by the Autoritat Catalana de la 
Competència (2016), a dynamic perspective of competition it is desirable to 
assess to what extent the integration would boost the incumbent’s data 
advantage, hinder rivals from access to viable alternatives, or allow for 
exclusionary practices, limiting innovation in the near future. 
This sort of exercise is imperative in data-driven mergers for at least 
two reasons: (i) data can be considered as a market in itself; and (ii) a dominant 
position in one data-driven market can be used to gain a dominant position in a 
second market that is (initially) not data-driven (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 
2017).  
                                                     
31 Sidak and Teece (2009) argue that competition authorities should take potential 
competitors and their capabilities more seriously, as new entrants almost always drive 
innovation in established industries. 
32 Id. As capabilities transcend products, they are defined as “upstream resources” and 
are a better proxy for the firm’s competitive position than is its downstream market 
share” (p. 38). In a dynamic context, a firm will have a kaleidoscope of products, yet 
the underlying capabilities are likely to be more stable (p. 39). 
33 According to OECD (2007, p. 22), dynamic efficiencies are processes that occur over 
time or multiple time periods and lead to lower costs, new products, or improved 
products, e.g., innovation and learning by doing. See Sidak and Teece (2009). 
34 Merger analysis incorporates predictive fact-finding in terms of the likelihood of a 
successful entry, and the effects on prices post merger. To a less extent, competition 
authorities also apply a forward-looking analysis of future effects of efficiencies and 
innovation. See Ginsburg and Wright (2012).  
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 23 - Número 2 - 2017 
132 
3.1. Forward-looking approach to market definition 
Except for Twitter, platforms like Amazon, Google, and Facebook do 
not currently trade data with third parties, which seems to be the reason why 
the EC has defined the markets for, e.g., targeted ads, search engines and social 
networks, but not for user data35. However, “by defining a wider market for 
data, competition authorities and courts will be able to take a form of potential 
competition into consideration whereby online platforms providers also 
compete in a market for data” (Graef, 2015, p. 492).   
As noticed by Graef (2015), a dynamic approach to market definition 
would be useful to evaluate the competitive situation beyond the relevant 
market for the current services offered to users and advertisers, and to assess 
competitive situations in a potential market for data used for improving the 
services provided on online platforms 36. 
This goes in line with the opinion of the US FTC Commissioner 
Pamela Harbour, who suggested defining “a putative relevant product market 
comprising data that may be useful to advertisers and publishers who wish to 
engage in behavioral targeting.” In the Commissioner’s view, this market 
definition would be more realistic37.  
3.2. Connected markets and the domino effect 
Defining a potential market for data needed to provide services for 
users and advertisers would also be helpful to understand the incentives of 
data-driven platforms to leverage market power to an adjacent or “connected” 
market, and repeatedly in other markets (“domino effect”). As defined by Prüfer 
and Schottmüller (2017), connected markets are “situation where user 
information gained in market A is a valuable input to improve one’s perceived 
product quality in market B”. Moreover, “firm 1 will enter market B when it 
has become sufficiently dominant in market A”38. 
                                                     
35 For instance, see Facebook/WhatsApp (2014) and Google/DoubleClick (2008). 
36 For more details on the possibility of defining a “potential market for data needed to 
provide services to users and advertisers” see Graef (2015, p. 493). 
37 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, Google/DoubleClick, 
FTC File No. 071-0170, 20 Dec. 2007, p. 9, 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ public_statements/statement-matter-
google/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf.  
38 “[W]e applied the model and exemplified the domino effect by showing that Google’s 
strategy to invest in many apparently unrelated markets can be rationalized by our 
model: these markets are either already connected (by user information driving indirect 
network effects in each of them) or the firm is trying to identify business models where 
user information from existing markets can serve as a valuable input into traditional 
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In the discussed model, entering and dominating a connected market 
will be possible when firm 1: (i) develops a service or product that makes good 
use of user information gained in one’s original market; and (ii) possess a lot 
of relevant user information in its home market (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017, 
p. 17). This theory largely explain Google’s successful business model of 
acquiring and entering markets far from its core business (e.g., driverless cars, 
“smart home” appliances, and healthcare39), but that can all benefit from access 
to a common pool of user information. 
After the antitrust dismantle of conglomerates in the 1980s, 
intervention in conglomerate markets has been exceptionally rare (OECD, 
2007). However, the rational that conglomerate mergers do not change the 
incentives of the merged firm to change its behavior (Bork, 1978) does not seem 
to hold in the context of data-driven markets: what may looks like a messy 
conglomerate on the surface, can have a lot more synergies underneath. Due to 
data-driven indirect network effects, a conglomerate merger can allow higher 
concentration in the potential market for user information and the possibility of 
tipping in correlated markets.  
3.3. Do we need new tools?  
By disregarding dynamic effects a competition authority may forego 
potential consumer benefits or harm from these effects (OECD 2007, p. 226), 
especially in markets that are rapidly evolving and in areas where confidence 
in predictive fact-finding is supported by sound economic theory and empirical 
evidence (Ginsburg and Wright, 2012). However, as framed by Commissioner 
Margaret Vestager (2016), “we don’t need a whole new competition rulebook 
for the big data world. (…) what we do need is to pay close attention to these 
markets and to take action when it’s necessary”. 
Despite the institutional difficulties and personal limitations, 
competition authorities can overcome the challenges of dynamic analysis by: 
(i) compelling customer, suppliers, and rivals to identify potential competitors 
and possible technological developments; (ii) conducting industry-specific 
studies on innovation; (iii) hiring industry experts to become informed about 
unfolding innovation; and (iv) conduct consumer surveys to determine what 
kind of product development consumers would (not) value. Those measures can 
help authorities to better construct likely hypothetical scenarios about how a 
                                                     
markets.” (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017, p. 20-31). 
39 See “Google transforms into new Alphabet tech conglomerate”, Financial Times, by 
Richard Waters and Eric Platt, August 11, 2005, https://www.ft.com/content/9a291bf8-
3fa2-11e5-b98b-87c7270955cf. 
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proposed data-driven merger can change the future market conditions.  
4. Could a dynamic analysis have changed the outcome of 
Facebook/WhatsApp? 
As reported by OECD  (2016), with WhatsApp owning the leading 
messaging platform and Facebook offering the most widely used social 
network, the merger between the two companies has been a focal point in the 
debate about big data, competition and privacy. 
On October 3, 2014, two months after its notification, the EC cleared 
the merger between Facebook and WhatsApp. At that time, Facebook had 1.3 
billion users, while WhatsApp had around 600 million users40. The EC assessed 
the impact of the transaction on three services: (i) consumer communications; 
(ii) social networking; and (iii) online (non-search) advertising. In sum, the EC 
concluded that the parties were distant competitors in markets (i) and (ii), and 
that consumers and advertisers would continue to have a wide choice of 
alternatives in, respectively, markets (i) and (iii) post-merger.  
The transaction was approved even considering the possibility of 
automated user matching – which was denied at the time of the notification41 –
, as a large amount of internet user data valuable for advertising would continue 
to exist. However, in August 2016, WhatsApp announced that it would start 
disclosing the phone number and analytics data of its users to Facebook42. In 
May 18, 2017, EC fined Facebook €110 million for providing misleading 
information regarding the alleged technical impossibility of matching users of 
both platforms. 
Finally, in the EC’s view, any privacy-related concerns flowing from 
the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a result 
of the merger do not fall within the scope of the EU competition law rules but 
                                                     
40 According to para. 128 and FN 76 f the EC’s Decision. 
41 At the time of the acquisition, Facebook said that it was not technically possible to 
match WhatsApp users’ ID with Facebook accounts because most people did not load 
the phone number used to register on WhatsApp onto their Facebook profile. 
Subsequently, in August 2016, WhatsApp announced, among other updates on its terms 
of service and privacy policy, the possibility of linking WhatsApp user phone numbers 
with Facebook user identities. See, EC Press release on May 18, 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm. 
42 According to WhatsApp, data-sharing will allow Facebook to use a person’s phone 
number to improve other Facebook-operated services, such as making new Facebook 
friend suggestions, or better-tailored advertising. See Isaac and Scott (August, 2016) 
and NYT (2016). 
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within the scope of the EU data protection rules43. 
We believe that the adoption of a more dynamic oriented approach 
could have included the following subjects in this merger analysis: (i) a 
forward-looking relevant market definition; (ii) the elimination of potential 
competition; (iii) connected markets and domino effect; and (iv) quality 
degradation in terms of lower privacy protection.  
4.1. A dynamic market for data 
Even without defining and analyzing a market for the provision of 
data, the EC concluded that post-merger, “there will continue to be a large 
amount of Internet user data that are valuable for advertising purposes and that 
are not within Facebook’s exclusive control”44.  
The EC referred to data collection across the web in general, without 
differentiating between different types of advertising, considering Google, 
Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, 
Adobe and Yelp as market participants that collect user data alongside 
Facebook45. As we saw in Section 2.2., the first caveat is that not all those firms 
collect the kind of data that can compete with the granular, up-to-date user data 
collected by Facebook.  
From a static perspective, were the market to be defined as “non-
search advertising on social network”, as initially ventilated by the EC 
Decision46, we would see that the data collected by the platforms mentioned 
above are not substitutable from the demand or producer side47. This is because, 
                                                     
43 See para. 164, p. 29, EC Decision. 
44 See para. 189, EC Decision. 
45 See para. 188-189, EC Decision. 
46 See para. 76 an 77, EC Decision: (76) (…) search and non-search ads are not 
substitutable as they serve different purposes (for search ads, mainly generating direct 
user traffic to the merchant's website, while, for non-search ads, mainly building brand 
awareness) and, as a result, most advertisers would not be likely to switch from one 
type to another in the event of a 5-10% price increase. (77) (…) A number of 
respondents considered that other forms of non-search advertising are not as effective 
as advertising on social networking websites and notably on Facebook, due to 
Facebook's large and highly engaged audience and its ad targeting opportunities.  
47 Twitter data seems like the only good substitute for Facebook data - although the 
inverse does not seem to hold. See the arguments made by John David Rich in 
PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter (2012) affirming that tweets are “contemporaneous reports on 
users’ experience that provide unique feedback regarding consumers’ reactions to 
product and brands” and that the possibility of respond and retweet “provides unique 
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as seen in Section 2.2., Facebook collects data on social graph, interactions, 
and profile information, while Apple, Amazon and eBay collect data mainly on 
purchase behavior, and Google, Yahoo/Bing on search queries and clicked 
links. Data collected by search engines can be use to provide online search 
advertising but is hardly be used to provide social networking advertising.  
From a dynamic perspective, if the EC had gone beyond the current 
services being offered by the merging parties, and realized that users’ data, as 
an upstream resource, is a better thermometer of competitiveness than 
downstream market shares, a relevant market for data could have been defined.   
Firstly, following the approach suggested in Section 4.1., if we 
identify the market as “data needed to provide non-search advertising and 
relevant services in social network”, Facebook/WhatsApp merger would render 
Facebook dominance even more indisputable for both sides of the platform. 
Unlike the EC, we do not see how “Google+, LinkedIn, MySpace, Pinterest and 
InterNations”48 could impose a competitive constraint to Facebook’s near 2 
billion users platform, as none of them have similar scale or network effects 
and, in the case of LinkedIn, it is a professional, and not a social network as 
Facebook. In this scenario, the merger analysis would likely conclude that 
Facebook is dominant in the market for advertising on social networks and, 
thus, integrating with WhatsApp’s data could have enhanced Facebook’s 
market power. 
Secondly, we note that even if the market was more widely defined 
as “data needed to provide non-search advertising”, the merger would reinforce 
a duopoly and lead to weaker contestability as only Google could pose a 
competitive constraint in this market49.  
4.2. Elimination of potential competition 
As pointed out by many critics50, the reason why Facebook was 
paying nearly $22 billion to buy a firm with modest revenues51 and less than 60 
employees, lies in the fact that WhatsApp, by scanning millions address books, 
                                                     
insight about which members of communities are influential).  
48 See para. 62, EC Decision. 
49 We also disagree with the EC Decision that “Yahoo!, MSN and local providers” 
would represent a “sufficient number of alternative” to compete against Facebook ad 
targeting opportunities and high return on investments. See para. 177, EC Decision. 
50 The Economist (May, 2017), EDPS Opinion 8/2016, among others. 
51 After transactions like Facebook/WhatsApp, authorities have incorporated an 
additional threshold based on the value of the transaction to the current turnover 
threshold. See OECD (2016, p. 20) and Monopolkommission (2015). 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 23 - Número 2 - 2017 
137 
had built an alternative “social graph”, the network of connections between 
friends, which is indeed Facebook’s most valuable asset. WhatsApp 
functionalities were becoming closer to offer a broader digital social 
experience, as provided by Facebook52. Therefore, Facebook was eliminating a 
nascent threat53 in the social network services, and the merger would rend 
Facebook’s dominant position in social network even less contestable in the 
future. 
Also, in the market for online advertising services, the merger was 
excluding the possibility of WhatsApp to serve non-search ads on its platform 
as an independent competitor. As observed in the dissenting statement in the 
FTC approval of Google/DoubleClick, also in Facebook/WhatsApp merger 
with respect to non-search targeted ads, the indirect network effects may not 
have been taken into account and the barriers to entry raised by the merger 
would mean that the advertisers would not have any alternative but to resort to 
the merged entity54.  
4.3. Tipping a connected market 
As the EC frames the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, there was no 
concentration problem in the market for target advertising as automated 
matching Facebook users’ ID with WhatsApp users’ ID was not technically 
possible, and even if merging data was possible, WhatsApp “limited” user 
information could not add much value to Facebook’s data hoard55.  
First, we understand that WhatsApp data (i.e., user name, picture, 
status message, phone number, agenda, etc.) could be used to improve 
Facebook relevance of service and future advertising purposes in the future. As 
data collected via mobile data analytics is more personal, geo-located, and can 
be cross-referenced with call behavior, it could help Facebook to improve some 
of its functionalities, like suggesting friends, as it is actually doing56.  Merging 
data could also be relevant for launching new AI services in the future. 
                                                     
52 As argued by many third parties, allowing for video calls, content exchange, creation 
of big groups, desktop access, etc., it seems that WhatsApp was already a provider of 
social networking services and should have been considered as a competitors of 
Facebook. See para 144, EC Decision. 
53 The Economist (May, 2017), p. 9;  
54 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in 
Google/DoubleClick. 
55 See paras 71, 180-188, EC Decision. 
56 See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/technology/relaxing-privacy-vow-
whatsapp-to-share-some-data-with-facebook.html?_r=1. 
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Secondly, from Facebook’s perspective, more crucial than to improve 
its data was to start serving ads in other markets. As pointed out by Fiegerman 
(2017), before the transaction, Facebook was hitting its maximum capacity for 
how many ads it could serve in its social network platform (included 
Instagram). Likely, the merger would expand Facebook’s presence in the 
mobile target advertising, and allow it to serve ads not only in its own 
communication app (i.e., Messenger57), but also in WhatsApp’s58. 
Thus, as suggested by the theory (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017, p. 
16-17) provided in Section 4.2., Facebook was looking for a connected market 
to develop a service or product (i.e., chatbots) that makes good use of user 
information gained in Facebook’s original market. Thus, evidence and 
economic theory indicates that Facebook’s main reason to acquire WhatsApp 
seems to leverage its granular user data already collected on Facebook in order 
to start serving targeted ads in WhatsApp, a connected market (initially) not 
data-driven. As we saw from the theory, due to indirect network effects and the 
decreasing marginal cost of innovating, Facebook can cause the consumer 
communication app market to tip in favor of WhatsApp. 
Thus, post-merger, services like Telegram would no longer be a 
relevant competitive constraint to WhatsApp59, which will be able to use its 
collective data with Facebook to innovate much cheaper and capture full 
demand in the consumer communication apps market (Section 2.4.).  
4.4. Privacy and quality degradation  
Although privacy is not the focus of this research, a more dynamic 
approach would have urged the EC to analyze whether consumers would be 
harmed by any privacy degradation, even if there was no breach of privacy 
                                                     
57 Spring, Facebook’s mobile shopping start-up, is an interface that allow users to begin 
a personal conversation with a “chatbot” that will show them a smattering of thing they 
may like. See Isaac (April, 2016). 
58 WhatsApp blog announced on August 25, 2016, that, although users phone number 
and encrypted messages stay private, it was changing its terms and privacy policy to 
allow it to “coordinate more with Facebook”, and test new ways for its users to 
“communicate with businesses” in the months ahead. See 
https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000627/Looking-ahead-for-WhatsApp.  
59 We also disagree with the EC’s point of view that LINE, WeChat, iMessage, 
Snapchat could represent a significative competitive constraint to WhatsApp 1 billion 
users platform, as they have much less users and user engagement, and Skype, Viber 
and Hangout are not mainly used for content and messages exchange, but for video 
calls. 
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laws. In particular, the EC could have analyze to what extent users would be 
able to detect quality degradation and switch to alternative apps offering higher 
privacy protection. Due to information asymmetry, the competition authority 
would be better equipped to evaluate the tradeoffs stemming from privacy loss 
than the consumers alone, considering that they cannot fully assess the value of 
their data, and are the victims of intrusive advertising and behavioral 
discrimination60.  
5. Conclusion  
In data-driven markets, players do not merely compete on prices, but 
in service perceived quality, and by introducing new features and products. 
While big data may boost innovation and connectivity, it can also entrench 
market power and compromise privacy. This tradeoff could be better addressed 
by further integration of dynamics effects into competition analysis.  
In particular, regarding the analysis of data-driven mergers, 
competition authorities could take into account that: (i) data can yield an 
unreplicable advantage and entrench market power, as information about users’ 
last minute behavior is not easily or readily available; (ii) dominant platforms 
nowcast not only consumer’s behavior, but also the development of rivals’ 
business models, precluding nascent threats from a chance to displace 
incumbents; (iii) data-driven indirect network effects can cause the product 
market or a correlated market to tip much more easily, hindering entry.   
As suggested with the re-evaluation of Facebook/WhatsApp, a more 
dynamic analysis, however challenging and imperfectly, is better equipped to 
account for data-driven mergers’ effects on consumer welfare in the long-run 
(Sidak and Teece, 2009; and Buttarelli, 2016). Thus, future market conditions 
could have prompted the EC to define a market for data needed to provide 
services for users and advertisers, and carefully consider how WhatsApp 
acquisition could be a strategy to eliminate potential competition, a way of 
tipping a connected market, or even a form of quality degradation in terms of 
privacy reduction.  
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